Instead of gathering in San Francisco, I wrote this piece at home and sent it to my American fellow students, hoping to help them better understand us Chinese.

It seems to me that the current confrontational opinions about Tibet can be attributed, largely, to a dispute about framing.  There are two distinct issues that are intentionally or inadvertently mixed up by both sides of the disturbance.  One is human rights, and the other is anti-secession.  Chinese government and the Tibetan activists both tend to legitimize their claims by manipulating one issue while distorting another.  Ironically, neither of these two slogans is original in China or Tibet, and both attempt to get the voice heard, in the modern and substantially Westernized world, by taking advantage of something borrowed.  So far, however, it appears that the Tibetan side is more successful in applying this strategy.

The unsatisfactory human right situation in China, at least when judged by the Western standard, is something beyond doubt, probably even in the eyes of the most patriotic Chinese people.  It is like a public nuisance to all people, whatever ethnic group they belong to, in the country.  To Westerners, it may be surprising when they see how drastically Chinese people, both intellectuals and grass roots, have behaved this time against the basic claim of human rights.  This seems even shocking to someone who is familiar with the historic incident happened in China some 19 years ago.  How can those who once rose up vigorously to call for human rights under an authoritarian regime now become equally, if not more, vigorous to upbraid the Western support for another human rights movement?  The reason is that the second dimension of the story has been ignored by those who do get surprised.

If Chinese government is inept at packing up its proposition abroad, this time it did a great job at home.  It makes the people sincerely believe that their government is fighting against the separatists rather than human right activists.  Here, I have to make it clear, that most Chinese, me included, never doubt that Tibet is part of China.  It is equally important to understand that the value of unification of the country is so deeply rooted in the heart and soul of Chinese, top and bottom alike.  Yet, here again, something old clashes with something new.  A genuine belief of Chinese can easily be treated as a false consciousness by the outsiders.  The key point is: how can you legitimately claim Tibet is a part of China?  If it were not, then Chinese wouldn’t be able to justifiably and rationally accuse the so-called Tibetan separatists no matter how we Chinese cherish unification of the country because Tibet is simply not supposed to be unified.  Unfortunately to Chinese government, and maybe Chinese people as well, the Chinese idea of country or state is not able to get around in the Western world while the Tibetans adroitly adopt the Western idea of nation state to address their point: Tibet is not and should not be a part of China.

The notion of nation state and sovereignty is an imported article to us Chinese.  The traditional Chinese image of a nation or country is more like a series of circles around a common core.  In this sense, the boundary of a country is relatively vague and fluid.  In history, many regimes of ethnic groups located at the margin of the Empire did, from time to time, seek protection from the central power.  In return, they would pay tributes and recognize the formal authority of the Chinese government. In Chinese history records, this was usually described as a claim to become subjects of the Chinese Empire.  So in the eyes of the people under these regimes, they might be an independent kingdom, but to Chinese people and their government, these regimes were a second rank sovereignty subject to the control of China.  To make matters worse, even the central government of Chinese Empire was controlled by minority ethnic groups from time to time in history.  To legitimize their governance, these minority controllers tended to further blur the boundary of the country or state, by stressing that the idea of country itself had less to do with ethnic backgrounds, but more with political influences.  The most representative example is the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) which used its political and military power to rule the majority Hans as well as minorities including Tibetans.  These backgrounds make it clear, that the traditional Chinese image of a country tends to be broader than the Westernized nation state.  Even a confederation may well be taken as a single country.  Thus, when we Chinese are using our own standards for judgment, it is totally reasonable to believe that Tibet has been part of China at least since the 17^th century when the Chinese central government officially set a governing office there and when the Tibetans recognized the formal authority of the Chinese government to approve the nomination of top Tibetan religious and political leaders, including the Dalai Lama.  Three centuries is a time period long enough to witness a country came out of nothing.  Then, why shouldn’t it be sufficient to solidify the status of a region as part of a country?  Understanding these facts, Western observers may hopefully feel less amazed at the vigor which Chinese people have shown this time in supporting their government, one that is not always so popular with the people.  In any event, Chinese leaders, having better knowledge of this subtlety than the foreigners, did well in creating a focal point, perhaps by over-revealing one side and concealing the other side of the coin, to organize the people to stand behind its actions.

A further concern about the Tibetan problem comes from the fact that the majority of Chinese people as well as the government taking an atheism attitude cannot fully understand the influence of religion upon the Tibetans.  A false impression of the Chinese government seems to be that economic growth can eventually neutralize political discontents, which may be more or less true for the non-religious majority Hans yet completely miss the point in Tibet.  For somewhat the same reason, the majority Hans seem misleadingly believe that their contributions to the economic growth in Tibet are well worth respect and affection from the Tibetans.

To summarize, I believe the Tibet problem represents a clash between something old and something new, something borrowed and something blue.  As a Chinese, I share the patriotism with my fellow citizens, many of whom are now gathering in San Francisco to “protect” the torch, but at the same time, I am also deeply concerned about the potential of an eruption of radical nationalism.  Further, the Chinese government should not misunderstand the people’s patriotic supports for national unification as a support for disclaim of basic human rights.  When these two are mixed up, it’s hard to take one action without signaling both.